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Recently there have been numerous 
violations of political freedom and eth- 
nic minority rights in the former Soviet 
republic of Moldova. These human 
rights abuses have resulted from two 
significant political processes: the rise 
of Romanian nationalism; and separa- 
tist movements in the Transdniester 
and the Gagauz regions. Political op- 
ponents and mqmbers of ethnic mi- 
norities are ruthlessly persecuted in all 
regions; Moldova proper, Gagauzia, 
and Transdniestria. As Anatol 
Tsaranu, Chairman of the Parliamen- 
tary Commission on State Security and 
Military Affairs, observed: 
In a country with no established 
democratic traditions, a country 
which has experienced chronic po- 
litical instability in recent years, a 
country going through a severe eco- 
nomic crisis, extraordinary phenom- 
ena can be expected. The impetus 
could be provided by the most ordi- 
nary event (Prikhodko 1993,3). 
The two political developments- 
Romanian nationalism and anti- 
Moldovan separatism-have to be 
placed within the context of the two 
opposing political pressures being ex- 
erted on Moldova: one from Russia, 
which wants to see Moldova reinte- 
grated into a renewed Russian Empire; 
and the other from Romania, which 
would prefer reunification with 
Moldova. Transdniestria and Gagau- 
zia are leaning strongly towards 
Russia, Moldovan nationalists are 
campaigning for reunification with 
Romania, and the Moldovan govern- 
ment is trying to remain independent 
of both. However, the deplorable state 
of the Moldovan economy is making 
Moldovan autonomy less viable and is 
forcing Moldova tdward joining the 
CIS. 
Russian Interference 
Russia's interference in the Trans- 
dniester conflict in Moldova has 
occurred through the participation of 
the 14th Russian Army, under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant General Alexan- 
der Lebed (a protege of Russian 
Defense Minister General Pave1 
Grachev). There is considerable evi- 
dence that the 14th Army's actions 
against Moldova were authorized by 
the military hierarchy in Moscow and 
condoned by senior government offi- 
cials there. The Russian government 
never tried to prevent several thou- 
sand volunteers from Russia from 
fighting on the side of the 
Transdniester Republic (TDR) against 
Moldova. Furthermore, the Russian 
government increased its economic 
aid to the TDR. At the same time, nego- 
tiations to withdraw the Russian 
troops from eastern Moldova remain 
at an impasse (Socor 1993, January 1). 
The stalemate in the present negotia- 
tions have forced Moldova to extend 
the CSCE's Moldova's Mission by an- 
other six months (Socor 1993, Novem- 
ber 10). 
In March 1991, Yeltsin officially 
transferred 15,000 troops of the 14th 
Army to Russian control. His former 
vice-president, Rutskoi, visited 
Tiraspol and said that the republic 
should continue to exist (Europa 
World Yearbook, 2802-6). According 
to eyewitnesses, personnel and equip- 
ment from the Russian 14th Army par- 
ticipated in the fighting against the 
Moldovans (Department of State 1993, 
850). 
On September 13, 1993, Lt. Gen. 
Aleksandr Lebed, participated in a 
four-way race for a seat in the 
Transdniester Republic Supreme So- 
viet, and won 88 percent of the votes. 
During his campaign, he pointed out 
that Russian Federation citizens enjoy 
full political rights in Transdniester. 
No Russian civilian or military author- 
ity tried to prevent him from joining 
the Transdniester government (Socor 
1993, September 14). 
At a news conference in Chisinau on 
November 1,1993, the Moldovan side 
of the joint commission supervising 
the cease-fire in Transdniester accused 
the Russian side of multiple violations 
of the cease-fire agreement. Reported 
violations include: allowing the pen- 
etration of additional Transdniester 
forces into the "security zone" be- 
tween the conflicting sides; blocking 
inspection of suspected Transdniester 
arms stockpiles in Bendery, where 
such stockpiles are banned; and toler- 
ating aggressive picketing by Russian 
Communist groups around the last 
remaining Moldovan police station 
and courthouse in Bendery, thus exert- 
ing pressure on the Moldovans to leave 
(Socor 1993, November 4). 
Russia has tried to justify its contin- 
ued presence in the Transdniester re- 
gion by blaming Romania for the 
political instability in Moldova. The 
pro-Yeltsin newspaper, Izvestia, has 
published an anonymous interview 
with a Russian Foreign Ministry offi- 
cial in which he stated that "foreign 
agents" control the Moldovan govern- 
ment. In this interview, the official also 
stated that the Russian militarybehav- 
iour in the region is premised on a 
"possible Moldovan-Romanian joint 
attack on the [TransIDniester Repub- 
lic" (Socor 1993, November 8). 
On September 10, 1993, the 
Moldovan government issued an offi- 
cial statement describing the recent 
escalation of Gagauz and Trans- 
dniester militancy, as the "direct re- 
sult" of recent visits to those two 
would-be republics by Russian parlia- 
mentary deputies who support the re- 
birth of the USSR (Socor 1993, 
September 13). Yet, when Moldovan 
Foreign Minister, Nicolae Tiu, ad- 
dressed the UN General Assembly, he 
described Russia's 14th Army as the 
catalyst of the Transdniester conflict 
and cautioned the international com- 
munity against granting Russia the 
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mandate of "peacemaker" on the teni- 
tory of the former USSR. He com- 
plained of Russia's refusal to admit UN 
or CSCE observers to the deadlocked 
talks on the withdrawal of the 14th 
Army from Moldova and accused the 
Russian Foreign Ministry of "com- 
pletely misrepresenting" Russian 
policy (Socor 1993, October 20, a). 
Disregarding the criticism of the 
Moldovan Government, Russia con- 
tinues to send economic aid to the self- 
proclaimed republic, despite the 
alignment of Transdniester fighters 
with Yeltsin's opponents in the Octo- 
ber confrontation between Parliament 
and the President. On October 19,1993, 
Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Kiba 
told the Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol 
that Russia had delivered 35 billion 
rubles worth of fuel and raw materials 
to the TDR in the first nine months of 
1993. According to Kiba, the deliveries 
are being handled by Russia's state 
firm, Rosskontrakt, and are covered by 
credits extended earlier. He stressed 
the importance of the deliveries con- 
tinuing on schedule (Socor 1993, Octo- 
ber 20, b). 
The Russian President demon- 
strated his complete indifference to the 
Moldovan Government by refusing to 
meet with President Mircea Snegur 
during his official visit to Moscow on 
October l8-19,1993. Snegur had hoped 
to capitalize on support that the 
Transdniester Communist fighters 
had provided during the Moscow re- 
bellion, and on the vocal support 
which he and Moldova had expressed 
for Yeltsin throughout that and other 
crises. The meeting was intended to be 
used to discuss with Yeltsin the ques- 
tion of the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Moldova, the political 
resolution of the Transdniester issue, 
the fate of Moldovan detainees in 
Tiraspol, and other pressing matters. 
Instead, Snegur was told on the second 
day of his visit that Yeltsin was indis- 
posed and could not see him (Socor 
1993, October 20, c). 
The deplorable state of the 
Moldovan economy is weakening 
Moldova's resistance to Russia. Ac- 
cording to Moldova's State Depart- 
ment of Statistics, the country's na- 
tional income dropped 20.2 percent in 
the first half of 1993, compared with 
the same period the previous year. Ag- 
ricultural output, the pillar of Moldo- 
va's economy, fell by 36 percent. 
ITAR-TASS said that experts consider 
the decline in production to be chronic, 
due to the unbalanced nature of the 
economy, the breakdown of tradi- 
tional economic ties, and the lack of 
raw materials. Inflation in the first half 
of 1993 was officially put at 24.3 per- 
cent, but the newspaper Nezavisimaya 
Moldova reckoned it was really 300 per- 
cent (Sheehy 1993). Moreover, some of 
Moscow's policy initiatives are aggra- 
vating Moldova's economic situation 
and further undermining their inde- 
pendence (Socor 1993, November 5). 
For instance, the excise and value 
added taxes imposed in August 1993 
by Russia on agricultural imports from 
Moldova, cost Moldova more than 40 
billion rubles in lost exports. The mag- 
nitude of the economic impact was 
equal to the previous year's drought, 
which had necessitated international 
relief. The new Russian tariffs influ- 
enced Moldova's decision to join the 
CIS Economic Union and ratify Moldo- 
va's membership of the CIS. 
The Rise of Romanian Nationalism 
The rise of Romanian nationalism in 
Moldova is apparent in three political 
developments: (1) the struggle to se- 
cede from the USSR (and to gain inde- 
pendence from Russia); (2) the 
persecution of non-Romanian minori- 
ties; and (3) the suppression of separa- 
tist movements within Moldova. 
The stronghold for nationalist ideas 
is the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF). 
The MPF was formed in May 1989, 
when a number of independent cul- 
tural and political groups joined to- 
gether, united by their common 
aspirations for separation from the 
USSR and for reunification with Ro- 
mania. The MPF was later renamed the 
Christian Democratic Popular Front 
(CDPF). 
Ideas of Romanian reunification 
found fertile soil among the Moldovan 
politicians and the population in gen- 
eral. During the February 1990 election 
to the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, none 
of the independent political groups 
were officially allowed to support can- 
didates. In fact, most of the 380 depu- 
ties elected (some 80 percent) were 
members of the Communist Party. Yet 
many were also sympathetic to the 
aims of the Popular Front. Approxi- 
mately 40 percent of the new deputies 
were supported by the Front, and a 
further 30 percent were estimated to 
favour its objectives. Mircea Snegur, a 
Communist Party member supported 
by the Popular Front, was elected 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet- 
eventually becoming Moldova's de 
facto President (Europa World Year 
Book, 2802-6). In August 1991 
Moldova declared independence from 
the USSR. 
Since its formation more than four 
years ago, the Christian Democratic 
Popular Front has transformed itself 
from a movement with broad political 
and popular support to an opposition 
party with ideals and aspirations no 
longer held by the majority of 
Moldovans. Most members of the 
Moldovan Supreme Soviet and the 
general population oppose reunifica- 
tion with Romania (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
1993). Despite their lack of popular 
support, members of the Christian 
Democratic Popular Front continue to 
press the Moldovan Supreme Soviet 
for Romanian reunification. 
The maverick party has also con- 
fronted Parliament on another conten- 
tious issue-membership in the 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States. On August 3,1993, Snegur pro- 
posed CIS ratification. Pro-Romanian 
members of the Supreme Soviet 
walked out of Parliament, thus creat- 
ing a political stalemate (for any deci- 
sion, the Moldovan Parliament 
requires a two-thirds majority). With 
the continued absence of deputies 
from Transdniester, along with ap- 
proximately 75 others who rarely fulfil 
their parliamentary functions, it has 
been difficult for Parliament to ratify 
any decision. The boycott by the CDPF 
candidates created a political crisis in 
Moldova and led to a decision by Par- 
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liament to hold pre-term legislative 
elections in February 1994 (UP1 1993, 
October 13). Until then, Parliament re- 
mains virtually paralysed. 
Having moved into the role of po- 
litical opposition, the CDPF has tried 
to destabilize Snegur's govemment. In 
February 1993, President Snegur de- 
clared several times that a coup #&at 
was being prepared by the CDPF. In 
February 1993, CDPF members pick- 
eted the presidential residence and 
tried to storm it before a violent con- 
frontation with the police in which sev- 
eral policemen were wounded (Holos 
Ukrayiny 1993). Around the same time, 
a letter from "Chernovitskaya Buko- 
vina," reprinted in Moldovan papers, 
suggested that the Romanian security 
service, in close contact with the CDPF 
extremist wing, had set up combat 
groups comprised of Moldovan vol- 
unteers. The Romanian Secret Service 
intended to use this force to overthrow 
the President, Prime Minister, and 
other leaders of the republic, thus fa- 
cilitating its reunification with Roma- 
nia. Members of CDPF interpreted 
Snegur's accusation as an attempt to 
discredit opposition so that he would 
be able to carry out reprisals 
(Prikhodko 1993,3). 
While the CDPF represents extreme 
Romanian nationalism, it does not 
hold a monopoly on nationalist senti- 
ments. A temporary commission for 
inspecting the state media of the 
Moldovan parliament has proposed a 
"patriotism exam" for journalists. Be- 
fore working in the Moldovan state 
press, journalists would have to recog- 
nize the integrity and independence of 
the Republic in writing. This proposal 
came from Tudor Topa, chairman of 
the temporary Parliamentary Com- 
mission for Inspecting the Activity of 
the State Ress. During the "party lead- 
ership of the press," he headed the 
press section of the Moldovan Central 
Committee Communist Party (ITAR- 
TASS 1993). 
In its effort to build a nation state, 
the Moldovan Government has taken 
measures to strengthen the dominance 
of Romanian culture in this multi- 
ethnic country. In August 1989, the 
Supreme Soviet of Moldova made Ro- 
manian the official language of the Re- 
public, and replaced the Cyrillic 
alphabet with the Latin one. Officials 
and employees are now obligated to 
know both Romanian and Russian. 
State enterprises are expected to use 
Romanian as their working language 
and as of April 1,1993, records could 
only be kept in the Romanian lan- 
guage. 
Furthermore, personal contacts at 
work between officials in languages 
other than Romanian are forbidden. 
Russian speakers have complained 
that language requirements have al- 
ready been used to dismiss ethnic Rus- 
sians from desirable jobs (Department 
of State 1993,853). In Russian and other 
national schools, Romanian language 
examinations have already begun 
(Chala 1993). At the Moldovan State 
University 17 instructors with Mas- 
ter's and Doctorate degrees were sud- 
denly discharged for "failure to 
qualify." All of them were non- 
Moldovans. One of them, the head of 
the Department of Modern Russia, had 
signed an open letter protesting the 
decision of the Ministry of Sciences 
and Education to cancel Russian phi- 
lology classes at the University. Her 
discharge letter said: "Does not qualify 
for her present position because of her 
sociopolitical activism aimed against 
the decisions taken by parliament and 
the government" (Grevtsev 1993,9). 
The Pirogov Congress of Medical 
Workers' Association in Moldova is- 
sued a document accusing the Public 
Health Ministry leaders of using lan- 
guage as a cover for persecuting peo- 
ple on ethnic grounds. Due to the new 
language requirements, almost all 
non-Romanian administrators have 
been relieved of their posts in the Re- 
public's Public Health Departments 
(ITAR-TASS 1993). This policy of dis- 
crimination has been implemented at 
all levels of educational institutions. 
Thus, in Chisinau the number of Rus- 
sian kindergartens has been reduced 
by half. Previously there were 150 
mixed schools in the republic-today 
the only language of instruction is Ro- 
manian. Similarly, two Russian news- 
papers have closed down (Soldatova 
1993). 
In addition to discriminating 
against non-Romanian minorities on 
the basis of language, the government 
has denied certain religious denomi- 
nations the freedom of expression and 
congregation. The practice of religion 
is generally free in Moldova. Parlia- 
ment passed a law in 1992 which codi- 
fied religious freedoms, but the 
activities of some religious groups 
were restricted. The law requires that 
religious groups be registered with the 
government and that denominations 
obtain government approval to hire 
nontitizens (Department of State 1993, 
851). 
This law effectively prohibits some 
denominations. For instance, the gov- 
ernment refused to recognize the Met- 
ropolitan Seat of Bessarabia (ancient 
rite), which revived its activities in ac- 
cordance with the rites of the Roma- 
nian Orthodox Church Synod 
(Rompres 1993). The law also prohibits 
"proselytizing," although, in practice, 
street preaching is still possible since 
Parliament did not provide an ad- 
equate legal definition of "proselytiz- 
ing." Although the Orthodox Church 
was not designated as the official reli- 
gion of Moldova, it remains a strong 
political and religious force. In one vil- 
lage, for example, the mayor requested 
permission from the local Orthodox 
Church before a Baptist congregation 
could build its own church (Depart- 
ment of State 1993,851-2). 
The Moldovan state has been ex- 
tremely reluctant to grant autonomy 
to its predominantly non-Moldovan 
regions: Gagauzia and Transdniester. 
Almost two-thirds of the Moldovan 
population of 4.3 million consists of 
ethnic Romanians. About 600,000 
people (14 percent of the entire popu- 
lation) live in the region of Trans- 
dniester, of whom about 60 percent are 
Russian speaking. Within Moldova, 
Ukrainians (14 percent) and Russians 
(13 percent) are the two largest minor- 
ity groups. A Christian Turkic minor- 
ity, the Gagauz, live primarily in the 
southern region. The Gagauz are 
largely Russian-speaking and repre- 
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sent about 3.5 percent of the popula- 
tion (Department of State 1993,851-2). 
On January 28,1990 a referendum 
on Transdniester autonomy took place 
in Tiraspol. The predominantly Rus- 
sian-speaking population voted over- 
whelmingly to seek greater autonomy 
for the region on the left bank of the 
Dniester River. On August 19, 1990 
and on September 2,1990, Gagauz and 
the Transdniester, respectively, pro- 
claimed themselves autonomous So- 
viet Socialist Republics. Both 
declarations were immediately an- 
nulled by the Moldovan Supreme So- 
viet (Europe World Year Book). The 
Moldovan government has used force 
to repress separatism, especially in the 
Transdniester region. In November 
1990 interethnic violence followed the 
announcement of elections to the 
"Transdniester Supreme Soviet" 
(ibid.). Clashes continued in 1991 re- 
sulting in hundreds of civilian casual- 
ties. In June of 1992, heavy fighting 
broke out in the city of Tighina 
(Bendery), when separatist forces at- 
tacked a Moldovan police station. 
Moldovan army and police reinforce- 
ments were sent to the city, and other 
Moldovan forces were mobilized to 
attack the separatist forces (Department 
of State 1993, 850). A few days later a 
cease-fire agreement was signed, and 
since then, the two sides have been 
trying to negotiate a settlement. How- 
ever, until now, their disagreements 
on Transdniester autonomy have not 
been resolved. 
Although the repression of Gagauz 
separatism has not been as violent as 
the Transdniester movement, certain 
incidents have occurred. At the end of 
March, there were serious distur- 
bances in Komrat, provoked by the 
suicide of a Gagauz man in a pre-trial 
detention cell at the Komrat police sta- 
tion. The Gagauz side maintained that 
the man died as a result of torture. A 
crowd of 200 to 500 people surrounded 
the police building, throwing grenades 
and Molotov cocktails. The police 
building was burnt to the ground 
(Selivanov 1993). 
In both separatist movements, 
the Moldovan state refuses to recog- 
nize claims for autonomy. The Draft 
Constitution protects the right of mi- 
norities to preserve their ethnic iden- 
tity, however, it fails to guarantee their 
right to self-determination (Bmpress 
1993, April 14). 
Violence Against Ethnic Minorities 
in Moldova 
The attitude of the Moldovan state to- 
wards its ethnic minorities has been 
largely benign. Violence against non- 
Romanians stems mainly from the 
CDPF and those inspired by its ideas. 
However, the state is partially respon- 
sible for the mistreatment of minori- 
ties; first, its language laws have 
transformed Russian-speaking people 
into second class citizens, and second, 
the state has failed to protect its ethnic 
minorities. 
One of the most important princi- 
ples of the 18,000 strong CDPF is that 
"the rights of the nation are above the 
rights of the individual." This princi- 
pal translates into discrimination 
against Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, 
Gagauz, Germans and others 
(Soldatova 1993). Members of the 
CDPF reportedly use the slogan, "Let's 
drown Russians in Jewish blood." 
They have been kidnapping, beating 
and raping their opponents (Zarya 
Pridnestroviya 1992). The Memorial Hu- 
man Rights Centre (1992, 18) reported 
that volunteer members of the CDPF 
serving on the Moldovan side of the 
conflict in the Transdniester region 
were involved in the beatings of pris- 
oners, general violence, burglary and 
murder on both the right and the left 
banks of the Dniester River.Neglect of 
minority rights and active discrimha- 
tion culminated with a phase of "anti- 
Russian hysteria" following the brief 
war in the Transdniester region. 
Around that time, the mass media 
spread propaganda about wickedness 
of non-Romanian people.' 
Russian cultural monuments were 
desecrated in Chisinau, and other 
Moldovan cities and towns (BBC 1992, 
October 5). Beatings and threats made 
to the .Russian-speaking population 
became common in the aftermath of 
the Bendery War and the authorities 
did nothing to stop them. According to 
a spokesperson at the U.S. Helsinki 
Commission, the Moldovan police are 
ignoring ethnic violence and the har- 
assment of minorities? 
Some Jews feel that there has been a 
rise in anti-Semitism among Romanian 
nationalists, provoked in part by the 
crisis in Transdniestria and Moldova's 
weakness against Russia (Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
1993). The CDPF suggested naming a 
street in honour of General 
Antonescu-an anti-Semitic Roma- 
nian Iron Guard in the 1930s who was 
responsible for the elimination of 
300,000 Jews in Romania, Bessarabia, 
Northern Bukovina and Trans- 
dniestria. 
Speaking of some 40,000 to 50,000 
Jews still living in Moldova, Leonid 
Baltsam, a representative of the 
Moldovan Jewish community at the 
August 1992 World Jewish Congress 
in Brussels said, "I hope my forecast is 
wrong but I cannot help feeling that 
the life of these people is in serious 
danger" (Baltsam 1992). Jewish refu- 
gees from the left bank received a hos- 
tile reception. They were reportedly 
forced to vacate a shelter in central 
Chisinau as a result of "anti-Jewish 
agitation protesting the large number 
of Jews who had gathered there."3 
While the Moldovan state can 
hardly be accused of anti-Semitism or 
other forms of racism, it has been un- 
able to protect Jews and other ethnic 
minorities from violence.' Authorities 
have been reluctant to recognize anti- 
Semitic incidents and, instead, con- 
tinue to classify them as acts of 
hooliganism. For instance, in the city 
of Sorroki, Jewish graves were des- 
ecrated. Leaders of Jewish organiza- 
tions demanded that this incident be 
recognized as anti-Semitic, yet the au- 
thorities insisted that it was common 
vandali~m.~ This impotence and reluc- 
tance of the Moldovan authorities to 
intervene reflects the low priority that 
protecting minority rights has in com- 
parison to resolving the conflicts in the 
Transdniester and the Gagauz regions, 
resisting the mounting pressures from 
Romania and Russia, and coping with 
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the deplorable state of the Moldwan 
economy. 
Abuse of Rights in the 
Transdniester Republic 
The Transdniester Republic's human 
rights record is considerably tarnished 
by its treatment of political prisoners, 
dissenters and Jews. Five CDPF mem- 
bers have been in a Tiraspol jail since 
May/ June 1992. They have been kept 
in steel cages and are stoned and spit 
upon by excited crowds calling for 
their executionO6 They have been on 
trial since April 1993 on charges of ter- 
rorism. On October 11,1993, the TDR's 
state prosecutor demanded the death 
penalty for three of the defendants and 
prison terms for the others. Numerous 
international human rights organiza- 
tions, and European bodies including 
CSCE, the Council of Europe, and 
Western embassies in Moldova have 
noted numerous legal inconsistencies 
in the trial and have demanded that 
the defendants be turned over to a law- 
ful court in Chisinau (Socor 1993, Oc- 
tober 12). 
There have been a number of accu- 
sations of politically motivated killings 
in the Transdniester region in connec- 
tion with the fighting that tookplace in 
1992. The separatist controlled pros- 
ecutor's office in the region has been 
reluctant to investigate these accusa- 
tions. Moldovan govemment police 
and prosecutors have been dismissed 
or forced to flee the area. Once re- 
moved from the area, central authori- 
ties cannot take steps to apprehend or 
punish those on either side responsible 
for human rights violations in the re- 
gion (Department of State 1993, 848). 
There is one remaining Moldovan po- 
lice station and courthouse inBendery, 
but local Russian Communist groups 
have been picketing them, demanding 
that these last seats of Moldovan au- 
thority be handed over to the TDR 
(Socor 1993, September 23). 
There has also been political censor- 
ship and politically motivated perse- 
cution in the TDR. Jamming of 
Moldovan Radio in the TDR began in 
1991, and continued in 1992. Likewise, 
distribution of the printed media has 
been restricted. Some individuals in 
the TDR who oppose the dcjzcto exist- 
ence of the TDR, have been harassed, 
dismissed from work, and physically 
attacked. Doctors and teachers trained 
outside the TDR have been systemati- 
cally raided as punishment for their 
presumed opposition to the TDR (Hu- 
man Rights Watch 1993, 239). The 
Transdniester government has forbid- 
den the use of the Latin alphabet, and 
its supporters routinely harass 
Moldovans living within its territory. 
Anti-Semitism is an integral part of 
the official ideology in the TDR. Many 
of Russia's pro-fascist militarist or- 
ganizations, such as the Russian Legion 
and the notorious Pamyat, have par- 
ticipated in attacks on Jews, and their 
members have infiltrated both non- 
profit and government organizations. 
A faction of theNational Salvation Front 
from Russia was created in the TDR 
(Basapress 1993, March 19). Russian 
nationalists in the TDR claim to have 
"won their first victory over the Zion- 
ist-American conspiracy throughout 
the Soviet Union (Russia)." Among the 
"conspirators" are Moldova's present 
government and those in the TDR who 
support the Moldovan Government 
and consider themselves citizens of 
Moldova (ibid.). 
The influence of Russia's fascist and 
Communist ideologists in TDR are ex- 
tremely strong. The TDR government 
has awarded orders to the entire edito- 
rial board of the anti-Semitic newspa- 
per "Den" (Day). Ideologists and 
leaders of other anti-Semitic organiza- 
tions in Russia have been similarly 
decorated (ibid.). 
The Constituent Assembly of the 
Transdniester branch of the Interna- 
tional Slavic Academy of Sciences met 
recently at the Dniester State Univer- 
sityinTiraspo1. Most of the Academy's 
leading officials and scholars are well 
known for their anti-semitic views and 
include such renowned nationalist ac- 
tivists as Igor Shafarevich who was 
asked to resign from the Russian Acad- 
emy of Science for his anti-Semitic 
publications (Rozenberg 1993). 
Deputies of Russia's Supreme So- 
viet, representing various ultra-na- 
tionalist organizations, such as 
Otchizna and the National Salvation 
Front, frequently visit Gagauzia and 
Transdniester (Interfax 1993). In June 
of 1993, a group of deputies from the 
Supreme Soviet of Russia, led by Sergei 
Baburin, arrived in the TDR (hsapress 
1993, June 22) to commemorate the 
events of the previous year 
(Nezuvisimaya Gazeta 1993). 
Today, in the TDR, the activities of 
all Jewish organizations have stopped 
and synagogues have closed. The au- 
thorities refuse to register new Jewish 
organizations and the media is full of 
anti-Semitic articles.' 
Although there have been few re- 
ported cases of human rights abuses in 
the Gagauz region, ethnically-moti- 
vated violence has occurred. It has 
been reported that armed Gagauz 
groups raided non-Gagauz (Moldo- 
van and Bulgarian) villages, plunder- 
ing livestock and vehicles (Radio Free 
Europe 1993). 
Freedom of Movement Within 
Moldova 
Persecution of ethnic minorities and 
violent confrontations have produced 
significant numbers of refugees within 
Moldova. Yet, it is difficult for them to 
escape from one part of Moldova (in- 
cluding its two self-proclaimed repub- 
lics) to another. Anyone moving 
within Moldova must state his or her 
reasons for doing so. A residence per- 
mit can be obtained if displaced people 
stay with relatives, in dormitories or in 
government supplied accommodation 
in hotels. The applicant must obtain 
written permission from the owner of 
the apartment in which he or she will 
stay, as well as from all other adult 
relatives living in the apartment. In 
practice, there are significant problems 
associated with finding an apartment 
or other residence in a country where 
housing is in such short supply (Infor- 
mation and Research Branch 1993). 
Emigration 
According to a poll conducted by the 
Moldovan Academy of Sciences in 
September of 199260 percent of Rus- 
sian-speaking citizens were ready to 
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leave Moldova because of "nationalis- 
tic" tensions (BBC 1992, October 5). 
Russian statistics indicate that, be- 
tween July 1,1992 and January31,1993 
(including the peak of the Trans- 
dniester conflict and its aftermath), 
11,072 people fled from Moldova to 
Russia, making a total of 191,431 who 
had arrived from Moldova in the few 
years prior to January 1993 (Soldatova 
1993). Others fled to the Ukraine dur- 
ing the Transdniester war, but many 
have since returned. For most of the 
uprooted, possibilities for emigration 
to the West are limited. Only Jews have 
an established channel of escape. The 
exodus of 60,000 Jews from Moldova 
during the period of 1989-19928reflects 
the seriousness of the present situa- 
tion. 
The armed conflict between Roma- 
nian and Slavic populations of the 
Transdniester region has affected 
many Jews. Alison Kaplan and Shimon 
Chertok estimate that there were 8,000 
Jews in the Transdniester region (with 
2,500 in Bendery and Tiraspol before 
the Transdniester War began). Many 
of them fled the armed confrontations. 
One-third of the Jews who fled emi- 
grated to Israel. Those who stayed re- 
mained anxious to get out (Kaplan 
1992; Chertok 1992). According to E. 
Danilyan, freelance journalist and spe- 
cial representative of the UN in 
Moldova, in September of 1992, there 
remained not more than 10 to 13 Jew- 
ish families in Bendery (Chertok 1992). 
Among those who still live in Moldova 
and the TDR, 70 percent have Israeli 
letters of invitati~n.~ Some Jews have 
been subjected to the practice of "dis- 
placement" prior to leaving. When lo- 
cal residents learn that a family is 
planning to emigrate, they break the 
lock on the apartment while the occu- 
pants are out and simply move in. 
When the family returns, they are told 
that since they are leaving anyway, 
they can move in with their relatives. 
The police do not interfere in such in- 
stance~?~ 
Many Moldovan Jews are reluctant 
to emigrate to Israel because of the dis- 
couraging letters received from com- 
patriots in Israel who experienced 
difficulties finding decent housing and 
jobs. In fact, the situation of some re- 
cent Moldovan Jewish immigrants in 
Israel was so desperate that they re- 
turned to Moldova. However, upon 
their return, they said in a public state- 
ment that they regretted their actions. 
They encouraged their relatives not to 
idealize their former homeland and to 
remain in Israel (American Association 
of Russian Jewry 1992). 
Notes 
The following illustrates the current ten- 
sions. On June 23,1992, following four days 
of heavy fighting in the right-bank dty of 
Bendery, Vitalii Balin, a 61-year-old econo- 
mist, was attacked at his place of work by 
three men, resulting in a two-week hospi- 
talization, lengthy convalescence, and par- 
tial loss of hearing in his right ear. 
According to the victim's wife, one of the 
men, who was known to Balin, had lost his 
brother in the war and was under the (false) 
impression that Balin had been collecting 
money to help in the war effort. The men 
beat Balin and threatened to kill his family if 
he reported the incident. Local offldals re- 
jected the claim that was filed aa a basis for 
Mtiating a criminal case against the attack- 
ers, and the Balins have decided not to pur- 
sue a dvil case, according to the victim's 
wife, for fear of retribution (Human Rights 
Watch 1993,235-6). 
IRB document, Helsinki Commission, New 
York, March 9, 1993, telephone interview 
with a representative. 
Soviet ]nu9 News (1992,89) originally cited 
in Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (1993). 
This may explain the statement on Novem- 
ber 23,1992, by the President of Moldova's 
Federation of Jewish Communities, who 
observed that "there is no anti-Semitism in 
Moldova either as a state policy or as a social 
phenomenon," and that the Moldovan gov- 
ernment goes to great lengths to meet the 
Jewish communities needs ..." (Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty 1992, November 21). 
Also, Nahum Keren, a senior diplomat with 
Israel's embassy in Moscow and currently 
in charge of setting up Israel's mission in 
Chisinau, stated that Moldova is more hos- 
pitable for Jews than, for example, Russia, 
and that the Moldovan authorities' attitude 
toward Jews is far more considerate (Socor 
1993, October 22). 
Telephone interview by Alexander Benifand 
with Semyon Vaisman, President, Jewish Or- 
ganizations and Communities of Moldova, 
co-President, JewishOrganizationsand Com- 
munities of CIS, August 7,1993. 
Information supplied by the Weizmann In- 
stitute of Science, Israel, distributed 
through netnews@eclipse.Stanford.edu. 
7. Interview with Vaisman,op. dt. 
8. Nova Russkoe S l m .  1992. Cited originally 
in ITAR-TASS, October 28. 
9. E. Danilyan, personal communication, 29 
May 1993. 
10. Soviet Jewry News 1992, August 30. Origi- 
nally cited in Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 1993. 
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